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With the enactment of the Law Society Act, 1970,1 the govern-
ment of the legal profession in Ontario has been, for the first time
in a half-century, subjected to systematic scrutiny. The significance
of this scrutiny extends beyond the precincts of Osgoode Hall, "the
permanent seat of the Society",' beyond the benchers who "govern
the affairs of the Society",' and indeed beyond the profession
itself. The quality of the internal government of the Law Society
is an important determinant of the profession's relations with the
public it serves and a model for the internal government of
other social and economic groups .
The statutory monopoly enjoyed by members of the Law
Society to render legal services' invests the regulation of their
admission, standards of behaviour, and modes of practice; with
a public character. The use, non-use, or abuse of the Society's
regulatory powers affects the administration of justice in its broad-
est sense. .
No less important than the Society.'s crucial role in the ad-
ministration of justice is its influence as a model for other groups
who claim similar status, based on real or spurious Analogies to
the legal profession . Such disparate groups as engineers, funeral
directors, teachers, and real estate salesmen have claimed varying
degrees of statutorily-authorized self-government . It is, of course,
*H. W. Arthurs, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto.
3 S.O ., 1970, c. 19 .
2 S. 4.
as . 10 .
'IS . 50 .
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possible to confine this privilege to groups which are "professions",
defining that term narrowly on the basis of either a priori concepts
or the identification of the characteristics of the historic profes-
sions . But we live in a society of groups, of sub-cultures, whose
desire for autonomy and self-determination will not be deflected
by a mere definitional exercise . So long as the legal profession
governs itself, other groups will continue to press for the right to
do so . Those who win self-government will be heavily influenced
by the shape and philosophy of the Law Society's constitution .
1. Powers and Functions of the Law Societv.
(1) Admission to Practice
The Law Society Act assigns control over admission to the
legal profession to its governing body, the benchers, in a rather
off-hand manner :
The benchers shall govern the affairs of the Society, including the call
of persons to practise at the bar of the courts of Ontario and their
admission to practise as solicitors in Ontario . s
That the "affairs of the Society" should include admission to
practice would not be so casually assumed by lawyers in many
other jurisdictions, including those in the United States,' some
continental countries,' or even solicitors in England.' In Ontario
(as in the other Canadian provinces) this assumption is apparently
so self-evident as to require no further and fuller statement .
In aid of their power to regulate admissions, the benchers
have express authority to "maintain the Bar Admission Course
. . . [and] . . . grant degrees in law",' to "make rules relating to
. . . student members and prescribing their rights and privileges,
. . . fees and levies . . . oaths, . . . employment . . . while under
articles . . . . degrees in law . . ." and to prescribe "procedures for
the call to the bar of barristers and the 'admission and enrolment
of solicitors"." Moreover, subject to the approval of the provincial
cabinet, the Society "may make regulations respecting . . . the
admission, conduct and discipline of . . . student members . . .
[and] legal education, including the Bar Admission Course"."
5 S . 10.
6 For a summary of "American state and federal bar admission pro-
cedures see Brand, Bar Associatioxts, Attorneys and Judges (1956), p. 1037
et seq .
'See e.g. Cohn, The German Attorney-Experiences With A Unified
Profession (1960), 9 Int. & Comp . L.Q . 580, (1961), 10 Int . & Comp. L.Q .
103 ; Ginsburg and Bruzelius, Professional Legal Assistance in Sweden
(1962), 11 Int . & Comp. L.Q . 998 .
' While the Law Society in England enjoys plenary disciplinary powers
over solicitors, membership in the Society is not, in fact, compulsory, see
Abel-Smith and Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts (1967), c. 8 .
9 S . 52.
10 S. 54 . 'IS . 55 .
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Lurking in this loose web of language is the shade of an old
controversy: should the profession control legal education? After
more than a century of direct intervention in the processes of legal
education, the Law Society had progressively, since the mid-
1950's, ceded de facto control to the . university law schools."
The survival of these vestigial traces of its de jure power in the
1970 statute is thus somewhat surprising, and indeed was criticized
during legislative debate on the new Act." In effect, the Society
now assumes direct responsibility for the practical instruction of
those seeking admission through the Bar Admission Course, which
comprises an "external" portion of apprenticeship in a law office,
and an "internal" portion of full-time attendance in a programme
of formal instruction in procedural matters. Through its ability to
control entry into its Bar Admission Course, the Society is in a
position to influence-if not to dictate-the content of a student's
programme in law school; by so doing the shape of law school
curricula is, in turn, effectively moulded. In point of fact, the
Society and the university law schools have reached a modus
vivendi based upon mutual respect for the integrity and autonomy
of each other's educational enterprise. Nonetheless, the continuing
power of the Society to "grant degrees in law" does preserve the
possibility that the profession may reassert its control over the
entire field of legal education if its working relationship with the
university law schools should deteriorate .
In addition to the relationship between the law schools and
the Law Society, control over admissions necessarily involves
control over the transfer to Ontario of lawyers from other juris=
dictions ." Transfers are permitted on a progressively more limited
basis to lawyers, respectively, from other Canadian common law
provinces, Quebec, the United Kingdom, Australia and New
Zealand, "Other Commonwealth Countries" and the United States .
Rule-making power is also expressly conferred to govern oc-
casional appearances in Ontario courts by counsel from other
jurisdictions."
In all cases, including "occasional appearance as counsel",
the right to practise is limited to "Canadian citizens or other
ritish subjects"." To the extent that training- in the common
law tradition is sought to be made a precondition to transfer,
such a provision may be quite unobjectionable. However, it is
clear that the citizenship requirement has some other basis, since
iz See Bucknall, Baldwin and Lakin, Pedants, Practitioners and Proph-
ets : Legal_ Education at Osgoode Hall to 1957 (1968), 6 Osgoode Hall L.J.
137 .
"See Mr. Sopha (L.-Sudbury), Legislature of Ontario Debates, 28th
Legis . (1970), 3d sess., at pp. 1481-1482 .
34 S . 28(c) (iii),- is S. 54 (1) 24 . '" S. 28(c) .
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the Act also provides that a lawyer who loses his citizenship there-
upon becomes ineligible to practise ." Presumably, this requirement
reflects the historic fact that lawyers, as officers of the Queen's
courts," were required to swear allegiance to the sovereign." How-
ever, the effect of the citizenship requirement is to potentially bar
from the profession otherwise qualified lawyers. At the present
time, the groups most likely to be affected are the children of recent
immigrants, young American college and law school graduates
who have emigrated to Canada, and lawyers from non-Common-
wealth countries. Of purely symbolic significance is the Anglo-
philic reference to "British subjects" rather than, say, "Common-
wealth citizens"." Its more offensive implication was avoided
with the deletion from the Act in its final draft of a requirement"
that the secretariat of the Society likewise be Canadian citizens or
British subjects .
Beyond the requirements of scholarship and citizenship, the
new Act for the first time requires that applicants for admission
be "of good character" ." Ontario had not previously imposed such
a statutory requirement, although it had informally (and ineffectu-
ally) required the filing of character references, which were never
actually scrutinized. The new "good character" requirement is
almost certain to do more harm than good : it is unlikely to identify
potential trust fund absconders, but may well deny access to the
profession to persons with idiosyncratic political beliefs or life
styles ."
In one important respect, the status of applicants for ad-
mission is made more secure . An applicant who has met all the
requirements cannot be refused admission, and is guaranteed a
hearing, a written statement of the reasons for refusal, and the right
to reapply at any time upon fresh evidence." However, rather
surprisingly in view of the opportunity for judicial review afforded
disbarred lawyers," no right of appeal exists for rejected applicants .
(2) Discipline
The new statute contains elaborate procedural provisions re-
lating to discipline . However, the traditional vague grounds of
"professional misconduct" and "conduct unbecoming a barrister
"S . 32 (1) .
'3 See now s. 29 .is Rules of the Law Society of Upper Canada, ss 51 and 53 (4) . `
" The two terms may be used interchangeably, Canadian Citizenship
Act, R.S.C ., 1952, c. 33, s. 23 (2).
21 Law Society Act, 1970 (Bill 7, 1st reading), s. 9. This provision was
attacked by Mr. Sopha, op . cit ., supra, footnote 13, at pp . 1491-1492.
22 S. 27 (2) .
23Cf. Martin v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1950] 3 D.L.R . 173
(B.C.C.A .) .
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and solicitor" remain the only articulated substantive standards for
discipline," although lawyers who are found mentally incompetent
or similarly incapacitated may also be suspended from, or limited
in, their practice ."
Such open-ended language as "professional misconduct" or
"conduct unbecoming" obviously invites more precise definition .
This task may be undertaken in part by a "common law" approach
of deciding individual cases as they arise, in part by a "legislative"
approach of laying down a code of professional conduct with
fairly precise standards. There seems no imminent likelihood that
the benchers will depart from the present common law approach,
which is supplemented only by a collection of nonbinding, ad-
visory "rulings" and the rather vague, largely hortatory, Canons
of Legal Ethics adopted by the Canadian Ear Association in
1920 and by the Society forty years later." Even if the benchers
do decide to move in the direction of more carefully drafted and
enforceable "legislation", however, they presumâbly could also
continue to look to the broad statutory standards."
The Law Society Act, then, continues the benchers' broad
powers to define the grounds for disciplinary action." However,
whether they. adopt the "common law" or "legislative" approach,
they are subject to potential external controls . Should they decide
to promulgate a code of ethics, the consent of the provincial
cabinet must be obtained . Should they simply proceed on a case-
by-case basis, there is a right of appeal to the Ontario Court of
Appeal from their decisions.
The existence of this right of appeal has important implications
for the development of substantive standards of professional con-
duct. Potentially the appellate court's power to "make such order
as the court considers proper"" could involve a shift in the locus
of lawmaking from the benchers to the court. If the court rejects
standards developed by the benchers, and substitutes its own,
the traditional wall. around the self-government of the profession
will have been breached . This prospect must give concern both
to traditionalists who believe that uninhibited self-government is
best, and to those who favour some form of public regulation for
the profession, but do not have confidence that the courts would
be its most appropriate instrument .
A more subtle potential for change in the quality, in the sub-
S. 34.z~ S . 35 .
'Now formally adopted by regulation under the Law Society Act,
1970, 0 . Reg . 419/70 , s . 23 .
29 Power to make regulations "authorizing and providing for the prepara-
tion, publication and distribution of a code of professional conduct and
ethics" is found in the Law Society Act, s . 55.
"See e.g. Hall v. Ball (1923), 54 O.L.R . 147 ."S . 44 (6) .
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stantive content, of disciplinary rules is also buried in procedural
provisions . The new Act requires a reasoned decision by the
benchers." Coupled with the growth of a body of appellate judg-
ments, such decisions will provide a corpus of knowledge about the
basis of discipline which is presently lacking." This, in turn, will
make possible a more sophisticated analysis of the issues by those
who decide cases, and by outside observers, and will facilitate the
growth of a jurisprudence of professional conduct .
Finally, the right to appeal is conferred upon "any person
dissatisfied with a decision" in a disciplinary matter" This
language is broad enough to embrace not only the lawyer who has
been disciplined, but the complainant who is disgruntled because
the benchers have refused to vindicate his complaint . Indeed, on
its face, the section would appear to permit any member of the
profession or the public to appeal . Should the benchers adopt an
unduly protective or cautious approach to discipline, they might be
moved to a more vigorous course by the invocation of this right of
appeal .
The statute, as indicated, deals with the substantive grounds
of discipline only by indirection. Its major thrust is to establish
disciplinary procedures . Regulations adopted under the Act" con
template a three-step procedure. The Secretary of the Society (its
senior administrator) is authorized to conduct a preliminary in-
vestigation "where information comes to the notice of the Society"
of the possible misconduct of a member. If he finds "reasonable
grounds" for doing so, he refers the matter to the Discipline
Committee under whose direction a formal complaint is issued,
and a formal hearing convened . The Committee itself possesses
only the power to reprimand the member (and, of course, to dis-
miss the complaint) ." If serious misconduct is found, the Com-
mittee reports its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recom-
mended decision to Convocation, the plenary body of benchers ;
Convocation alone may impose the full range of sanctions-rep-
rimand, suspension or disbarment .
Considerable concern for due process is the most obvious
feature of the new statute, especially in relation to the hearings of
the Discipline Committee . Provision is made for a formal com-
plaint, notice, a full hearing, right to counsel, limited protection
against self-incrimination, transcription of evidence, and other
32 S. 33 (12) .
as At present, only a brief conclusory statement accompanies the formal
announcement that a lawyer has been disciplined . For the only published
data relating to the grounds upon which lawyers have been disciplined, see
S. Arthurs, Discipline in the Legal Profession in Ontario (1970), 7 Osgoode
Hall L.7 . 235.
2 ~ S. 44 (1).
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familiar attributes of ordinary civil trials (including the rules of
evidence) . However, proceedings are to be held in camera unless
the "accused" lawyer requests a public hearing, presumably to
safeguard both his reputation and the client-complainant's secrets.
Strangely, neither the statute nor the draft regulations appear to
extend the same guarantees to the final hearing before Convoca-
tion, except that the "accused" is apparently to be afforded an
opportunity to challenge the Committee's findings and recom-
mendations in this ultimate forum."
Where the Committee has itself exercised its power to rep-
rimand, the member has the right to appeal to Convocation.
Ironically, in this latter situation members of the Discipline Com
mittee are expressly precluded from sitting on appeals from their
own decisions," although they are implicitly permitted to - parti-
cipate in Convocation's disposition of their recommendations in
much more serious cases involving suspensions and disbarments.
Another curious defect in the regulations is the failure to
afford complainants the right to appeal from an adverse decision
of the Discipline Committee to Convocation. Since the statute
envisages that complainants should ultimately be able to appeal
from Convocation to the Court of Appeal, it seems clear that the
regulations should provide a means of reaching Convocation in the
first place.
(3) Protection of Clients' Interests
In addition to punishing lawyers who have been guilty o£ mis-
conduct, the Society has increasingly sought to safeguard the in-
terests of clients from various forms of intentional and other harms.
As a defensive measure, the Society has promulgated a detailed
code relating to the handling of trust funds," its only "legislative"
attempt to define specific parameters of professional misconduct .
This code is enforced vigorously, both by a systematic monitoring
of lawyers' accounts, and by investigative measures wheA mis-
feasance is suspected. Offenders are inevitably dealt with severely .
However, the Society is committed to going beyond mere
preventative and punitive measures . Upon application to a Supreme
Court judge, the Society may obtain a "stop order" to freeze the
accounts of a lawyer suspected of misconduct." If "a . . . practice
is neglected to the prejudice of any person or no provision has
been made for. the protection of [a] client's interests" due to the
death, disappearance or discipline of a lawyer, a trustee may be
appointed to preserve, carry on, or wind up the practice." In the
"Ss 33-34 and 39 .
S. 39 (4) .
` 0. Reg . 419/70 , s . 17-22.ao S. 42 .
41 S . 43 .
ô	
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case of clients who actually suffer losses due to their lawyer's
dishonesty' or professional negligence," the Society has accepted
the responsibility of providing at least partial indemnity . The cost
of indemnification is born by a levy upon the profession as a whole.
(4) The Quality of Legal Practice and the Administration of
Justice
The Society is specifically authorized to establish programmes
of continuing legal education," and extension courses," and to
provide bursaries and scholarships," (presumably in the Bar Ad-
mission Course, in the law schools, or for post-graduate study) .
While all of these powers are no doubt intended to promote
high standards of professional practice, they are not self-executing.
Three elements must be combined if the level of legal practice is
to be significantly upgraded .
First, the Society must be prepared to mobilize the financial
and human resources required for any significant educational en-
deavour. Second, individual lawyers must be prepared to devote
time and sustained effort to self-improvement ; occasional attend-
ance at a large public lecture will not significantly alter the
quality of legal services . Third, the enforcement of at least a
minimum standard of competence and the recognition of superior
qualifications must both be formally undertaken by the Society .
As noted, the new statute envisages the establishment of a system
of indemnification for clients injured through their lawyer's incom-
petence." When claims on this fund mount, the Society will almost
surely be driven to control or eliminate those whose incompetence
creates a burden shared by the whole profession . As to the recog-
nition of superior qualifications, the Society has for some time
been studying the certification of professional specialists .'
That the legal profession should assume responsibility for
improving the quality of legal practice is hardly surprising .
However, the Society also enjoys a mandate for much broader
participation in the administration of justice . Two responsibilities
traditionally assumed by it, and continued under the new Act,
warrant special mention.
The reporting and publication of court decisions is, curiously,
41S. 51 .
43 Under s. 53, the Society is empowered to "make arrangements for its
members respecting indemnity for professional liability". As of the date
of writing (December, 1970) such arrangements had not yet been con-
summated .
S. 52 (1) .
'15 S. 54 (1) .
46 Ibid.
47 Supra, footnote 43, and Report of the Special Committee on Solici-
tors' Errors and Omissions Insurance (1970), 4 L.S.U.C. Gaz. 34.
4s See Report of the Special Committee on Specialization (1970), 4
L.S.U.C . Gaz. 33 .
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not a function of the courts or the provincial government, but of
the Society, which has delegated its statutory responsibility's to a
commercial publisher. Even the litigant is forced to purchase
reasons for judgment in his own case from the Society," while the
selective reporting of cases in the law reports, necessitated by
considerations of cost, inevitably introduces an element of edit-
orial subjectivity . Thus, commercial exigencies limit the easy
access of interested citizens to public documents affecting them-
selves, and of the profession to the entire corpus of case law .
Secondly, there is the matter of law libraries . Although an
indispensable adjunct to the courts in any legal system based on
precedent, law libraries in each county town (serving the local
court-house) and in Osgoode Hall (serving the Supreme Court)
are the responsibility of the Society ." Through a system of grants
to local law associations, the Society has established a farflung, if
thinly stocked, network of local law libraries . While obviously
better than no libraries at all, relatively little return can be antici-
pated from the modest sums made available by the Society." The
obvious problem is that the resources are those of the Society
and the local associations, drawn from membership fees, rather
than public funds . Absurdly, too, this produces the result that a
lawyer who chooses not to belong to his local law association (in
which membership is voluntary) may be denied the use of the
only law library available to him."
Surely, in both areas, a compelling case can be made for the
transfer of responsibility for these important services to the public
agencies involved in the administration of justice .
The Society also has a mandate to promote legal research."
This area of activity, hitherto confined to the law schools and the
provincial Law Reform Commission, would represent a new ven
ture for the organized bar. _While support for research from any
quarter can hardly be discouraged, the nature of the Society's in-
volvement does raise a real issue relating to its future role . In
brief, attempts were made both by members of the Society" and
49 S. 55. 11 0 . Reg. 419/70 , s . 25.
'IS. 54 (1) .
"For example, O . Reg . 419/70, s.,34 contemplates an annual maximum
subsidy of $600.00 to cover the salary of a librarian and telephone ser-
vice . S . 36 provides that the total annual grant will not normally exceed
$2,000.00 (except for York County, which embraces Toronto, the pro-
vincial capital) . A few large, affluent law associations could add to this
amount, but most could not afford to .
s3 O, Reg. 419/70, s . 38 .
54 S. 54 (1) ." A proposal was advanced-and defeated-at the first annual meeting
of the members of the Society in Windsor, Ont ., on Feb . 8th, 1969, "to
include in the objects of the Society the consideration and initiation of Law
Reform and the making of submissions to the proper authorities on matters
of Law Reform on behalf of the Society" . Letter to the members of the
Society from W. G . C . Howland, Q.C ., Treasurer, March 20th, 1969.
10
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by legislative critics," to move the Society into a more active
posture in relation to law reform . These attempts were unsuccess-
ful, due to at least three countervailing forces . First, the Society's
wide range of existing and proposed activities, apart from law
reform, already presented a formidable financial and administra-
tive burden . Second, conceivably, some conservative benchers
(and legislators) were reluctant to mobilize yet another agency
of change, especially such a powerful pressure group as the legal
profession . Third, some reformers, paradoxically, were anxious to
limit the Society to its traditional functions of accreditation and
discipline, for fear that intervention by the organized bar might as
often be hurtful as helpful to the cause of reform . Thus the
residual "legal research" powers of the benchers may be read,
implicitly, as a suggestion that the Society should not be involved
in the more politically sensitive area of active "law reform".
II. The Government of the Law Society.
The evolution of Anglo-Canadian parliamentary government can
be said to have moved through three phases-from absolute royal
authority to accountability to democracy.
The period of absolute royal authority, the Stuart regimes of
the seventeenth century, was one in which the monarch asserted
(if he could not always effectively insist) that he alone bore the
ultimate responsibility and privilege of government. With the
rise of parliament in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the
king became accountable for his actions, both in fact and in theory,
in fiscal matters, in foreign affairs, and finally in all aspects of
executive activity . However, he was accountable to two elite
groups : first, to a parliament which comprised lords and com-
moners, who were responsible, respectively, only to their progeni-
tors and to a narrowly-based electorate, and secondly, to a judi-
ciary also closely identified with privilege and prestige. Only in
the latter part of the nineteenth century, with the move towards
universal suffrage, is it possible to identify the advent of democ-
racy, in the contemporary sense of the term. Indeed, in the mid-
twentieth century, we have begun to question whether, and how,
citizen participation can be effectively extrapolated from the
periodic voting exercise to more frequent and more direct forms
of contribution to the processes of government .
Similar strains can be traced in the evolution of the govern-
ment of the legal profession in Ontario, although this suggestion
must be accompanied by two disclaimers .
First, it is natural that forms of private government should
as See e.g . Mr. Bullbrook (L.-Samia), op. cit ., supra, footnote 13, at
p. 1288 ; Mr . Nixon (L.-Leader of the Opposition), at p. 1325; Mr. Ren-
wick (N.D .P.-Riverdale), at p. 1334 .
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reflect philosophies of public government current at the time'of
their adoption, although the parallels are obviously not perfect.
Thus, some features of the Law Society which date from its es-
tablishment in the early nineteenth century are bound to .appear
anachronistic 150 years later.
Second, criticism of the forms of government does not neces-
sarily entail criticism of substantive policies . Although the Law
Society's governmental structure was rooted. in the values of an
earlier era, those who administer the structure at present have
considerable freedom to use it to pursue contemporary social
values . This they have done to a considerable extent in such areas
as legal aid and clients' compensation funds. Whether they have
acted out of a sense of public duty or out of self-interest is open
to debate, although one observer makes a cogent case for the
latter :
[Aldoption of policies in the public interest is most likely to result
when the situation in which the organized profession,must act is such
that meeting or anticipating the higher levels of public expectations
become conditions for safe-guarding or attaining important interests of
the profession. "
Keeping these two disclaimers in mind, what is the present
constitutional structure of the Law Society, and to what extent
can it be described as reflecting a philosophy of absolute authority,
of accountability, or of democracy?
The new statute' constitutes the Law Society of Upper Canada
"a corporation without share capital composed of the Treasurer,
the benchers, and other members from time to time"." Responsi
bility for its day-to-day governance, however, is clearly vested in
the benchers."
Initially, the benchers occupied a position analogous to that
of the absolute monarch, self-perpetuating and all-powerful." As
with the monarchy, much of what survives of this former regime
in the new constitution is purely symbolic : the anachronistic use
of "Uriner Canada" rather than "Ontario", of "Treasurer" rather
than "President" ; the gratuitous reference to the Society's original
statutes of incorporation "passed in the thirty-seventh year of
the reign of his late Majesty George III [and] . . . in the second
year of the reign of his late Majesty George ICI";" and the
" Giffen, Social Control and Professional Self-Government : A Study of
the Legal Profession in Canada, in Clark, ed., Urbanism and the Changing
Canadian Society (1961), p. 117.
"S . 2. The implications of this provision are discussed infra .
59 S. 10.
"See Riddell, The Legal Profession in Upper Canada in its Early
Periods (1916), p. 135 et seq. The author suggests that the initial assump-
tion of plenary power by the benchers over the affairs of the Society may
have been ultra vires.sl This reference elicited an extended jibe during the legislative debate
by Mr. Sopha, op . cit., supra, footnote 13, at p . 1342 :
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meticulous prescription of the Society's seal (" . . . on the dexter
side . . . the figure of Hercules, and on the sinister the figure of
Justice . . . .")sz and its coat of arms (" . . . a sable on a chevron
between two stags trippant . . . .") .63
While this is hardly the image which a modern profession
with high ideals of ppblic service should project, however, it is
important to realize that these arcane references are draped upon
an institution of rather more contemporary design . By the mid-
1960's a number of developments had already begun to signal the
advent of the benchers' accountability to the rank-and-file members
of the profession, if not to the public .
Most obviously, of course, the benchers themselves had long
since been elected by the profession itself, rather than self-
perpetuating." In addition, the benchers had developed various
informal techniques of communication with the members : publica-
tion of minutes of Convocation in the Ontario Reports, an annual
luncheon address by the Treasurer to the profession at the mid-
winter meeting of the Canadian Bar Association (Ontario Section),
and latterly publication of the taw Society Gazette.
Until 1969, however, no formal meeting of the membership
had ever been held, and until the new Act was introduced, there
was no statutory mention of its very existence, or constitutional
status . And if the winds of change had blown but gently in the
direction of internal accountability, the notion of public account-
ability was entirely becalmed. Aside from direct legislative inter-
vention, or the moral suasion of newspaper editorial writers, the
benchers could conduct the Society's affairs as they deemed best .
Essentially, the new legislation has created procedures through
which the benchers can, for the first time, be made accountable.
In so far as this process relates to public scrutiny of the affairs
of the profession, its genesis is, quite clearly, the McRuer Report :
The traditional justification for giving powers of self-regulation to any
" . . . if there ever was a father who was afflicted with dissolute and
reprobate sons, it was George III. Of the five that he ushered into this
world, that George IV should never be enshrined in a statute of this
province under any conditions at all . His character was absolutely be-
yond rehabilitation. The way he treated Mrs. Fitzherbert was shocking
to say the least, absolutely shocking. He announced himself that by
the age of 17 he was much addicted to wine and women, and he con-
tinued to drag the throne into degradation until his fortunate passing
in 1830 . . . .
Now really, in 1970 do we have to have that kind of thing in a
statute? Cannot we just say the law society is continued?"
68 Rules, supra, footnote 19, s . 2 .
"Ibid., s. 3 .
fia S.O ., 1870-71, c . 15 . Interestingly, this statute was entitled "An Act
to Make the Members of the Law Society of Ontario Elective by the Bar
Thereof" (emphasis added) . This accidental acknowledgment by the stat-
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body is that members of the body are best qualified to ensure that
proper standards of competence and ethics are set and maintained .
There is a clear public interest in the creation and observance of such
standards . This public interest may have been well served by the respec-
tive bodies which have brought to their task an awareness of their
responsibility to the public they serve, but there is a real risk that the
power may be exercised in the interests of the profession or occupation
rather than in that of the public . This risk requires adequate safeguards
to ensure that injury to the public interest does not arise. . . . [L]ay
members should be appointed . . . to the governing bodies of all self-
governing professions and occupations . ss
Moreover, the pervasive concern of the McRuer Report with the
principle of due process is mirrored by the elaborate procedural
provisions of the new Act.
Indeed, from its inception as a draft prepared by the Society
to its ultimate enactment as a government-sponsored public bill,
the yardstick by which supporters and critics of the new Act have
measured its adequacy was the McRuer Report." The "Explana-
tory Notes" with which the Act was prefaced give a tabular ac-
counting of the McRuer recommendations which are respectively
"adopted", "not applicable", or "not adopted", while the Attorney
General in moving first reading of the new legislation, stated that
it generally followed the McRuer recommendations."
What are the devices established by the new Law Society Act
which make the benchers accountable to the public?
In two important areas, the benchers' exercise of their powers
is subject to legal controls . Regulations made by the benchers re-
quire the approval of the provincial cabinet, in so far as they affect
such important matters as the admission, conduct and discipline of
lawyers, the publication of a code of professional conduct and
ethics, legal education, and the operation of local law associations ."
Secondly, as has been noted, the benchers' decisions in disciplinary
proceedings may be appealed to the Court of Appeal."
These provisions follow the general principles articulated by
the McRuer Report that the courts should have ultimate control.
over all adjudication, and that the cabinet, politically responsible
to the legislature, should pass on all significant "subordinate legis-
lation"." Their probable effectiveness can only be judged in the
light of experience . Will the judges prove more or less "public-
minded" than the benchers? Will the cabinet effectively scrutinize
" Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (1968),vol. 3, p. 1166 .es See e .g . the colloquy between Mr . Sopha and Hon. Mr. Wishart
(C.-Attorney General and Min . of Justice), op . cit., supra, footnote 13, at
p . 1497 et seq .
"Op. cit., !bid., at p. 96 ."' S . 55 .
'IS. 44.
"Op. cit., supra, footnote 65, pp . 1266 (recommendations 66, 67), and
1273 (recommendations 116, 119) .
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regulations submitted to it by the benchers, or merely rubber-stamp
them?
In addition to these two provisions, both of which relate to
the review of specific action taken by the benchers, the new statute
also establishes two instrumentalities by which the public may audit
the broad policies pursued by the Society.
The province's Attorney General is a bencher ex officio, and
although he has no right to vote," he is nonetheless specifically
designated as "the guardian of the public interest in all matters
within the scope of [the Law Society Act] or having to do with
the legal profession"." To discharge this function, he is empowered
to require the production of any document relating to the affairs
of the Society," and is specifically protected against disciplinary
reprisals by his fellow benchers for any action taken by him in
discharging the functions of his office .'
The Attorney General, of course, will inevitably be a lawyer,
and is a member of the benchers, the very body whose conduct
is to be reviewed . More to the point, he will almost always be
(or soon become) part of the legal "establishment" . His voice,
in any event, is only one amongst many, and is not, as noted, even
fortified by a vote . Thus, his guardianship of the public interest
may not be entirely effective.
The major defence of the public interest therefore rests with
a novel body to be known as "the Law Society Council", which
has a statutory mandate "to consider the manner in which members
of the Society are discharging their obligations to the public and
generally matters affecting the legal profession as a whole" ."
The membership's of the Council is one clue to its probable
effectiveness . It is, to be sure, fairly heavily weighted with mem-
bers of the profession's elite: the Treasurer and the chairmen and
vice-chairmen of the benchers' standing committees, and the
head of the Ontario section of the Canadian Bar Association (a
voluntary organization embracing most lawyers) . However, there
are a number of other constituencies within the profession which
may provide a diversity of informed opinion in the debates of the
Council : representatives of local law associations, the law schools,
law students, and three lawyers of less than ten years' seniority .
Finally, perhaps most importantly, nine lay members are to be
appointed by the provincial government.
A second clue to the Council's probable effectiveness relates
to its statutorily-defined powers and procedures . Unfortunately,
7's . 12 (2) .
"S . 13(1) .
73 Ibid .
'4 S. 13(3) .'s S . 26 (1) ."S. 26 (2) .
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from this perspective, the prospects for vigorous and intensive
scrutiny of the profession are less than certain. The Council is
to "meet at least twice a year, and . . . report after each meeting"
to the benchers and the provincial cabinet." However, no pro-
vision is made for a permanent secretariat, for the undertaking
of research, for the compulsory production of reports or other
documentation by the Society. The basic foundation of any evalua-
tion of the profession must be facts-and the,Council is singularly
lacking in the machinery to gather and analyze facts. Indeed, it
has no budget of its own, and is dependent on the Society for
funds." There is at least a risk that the members of the Council
(especially its, lay members) will be unable to discharge their
mandate effectively . To what extent the Society will recognize and
dispel this risk, by openness and frank disclosure, remains to be
seen . At a minimum, however, it is clear that the new statute
does not go as far in the direction of public accountability as the
McRuer Report had proposed ; the key recommendation of public
representation on the Society's governing body has been com-
promised.
To assert that the McRuer recommendations were, or were
not, followed does not, moreover, provide us with a definitive
judgment on the Act. The more fundamental question must be
asked as to whether accountability is a sufficient guiding principle
for the constitution of a modern professional organization. The
McRuer Report itself goes no farther than accountability ; internal
democracy-whether through representative institutions or through
direct participation of members-is no part of its concerns . This
deficiency is a serious weakness of the McRuer Report, but should
not be viewed as a reason for failing to trace the degree to which
democratic values are enshrined in the new Law Society Act.
The inquiry begins with the process of enactment of the new
statute. Revision of the Law Society Act apparently originated
with the benchers rather than the government, although no doubt
the latter's commitment to the McRuer recommendations would
have led it to press for revision at some point.
y November 15th, 1968, Convocation had approved for
publication what was described as the ninth draft of a statute.'°
In addition to comments from the press, the judges, law students,
and some individual lawyers, this draft Act was the subject of
heated discussion at a general meeting of the members of the
Society in Windsor on February 8th, 1969."'
°' S. 26 (3).
73 S. 26 (6).
'° Op. cit ., supra, footnote 55 .
s° Loc. cit. ; see also The Annual Meeting (1969), 3 L.S.U.C . Gaz. 46 ;Hardy, The Law Society of Upper Canada (1969), 41 Obiter Dicta (no.11) 1 .
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The Windsor meeting, significantly, was the first general
meeting of the membership ever held . To be sure, for several
years the Treasurer had delivered an annual "state of the pro
fession" report to a luncheon held in connection with the mid-
winter meeting of the Canadian Bar Association. However, on no
previous occasion had there been an opportunity for formal dis-
cussion of the Society's affairs . The need for such an occasion
was conclusively proved by the course of the discussion. A series
of resolutions concerning the draft statute was introduced by rep-
resentatives of the County of York Law Association, and endorsed
by representatives of several other local law associations as well
as by individual members . Those resolutions, which were adopted
by the meeting, included proposals to increase the number of
benchers (from thirty to fifty), the frequency o£ elections (from
five-year to three-year intervals), to gradually eliminate life ben-
chers (who held office by virtue of having served as elected ben-
chers for fifteen years), to formally recognize (as the draft statute
did not) that the Society comprised not merely the Treasurer and
benchers, but members as well, and to make permanent the new
institution of an annual meeting."
The presentation of these resolutions and their passage sug-
gested the existence of a "grassroots" sentiment that the benchers'
control over the profession was out of keeping with contemporary
democratic expectations . Their common theme was to enhance
the democratic character of the Society's government through
greater membership participation.
No less significant was the emergence of the local law asso-
ciations as important organs of opinion within the Society. While
the benchers had long recognized the local law associations as
representative bodies for purposes of fixing local minimum fee
tariffs," and administering local law libraries," the practice of
systematically consulting them on broad policy issues" has matured
quite recently . Yet the constitutional status of the local law asso-
ciations within the Society was (and continues to be) unclear.
No lawyer need belong to his local association, and no local as-
sociation need be formed in any county or, if formed, need pur-
sue any particular activities.
Thus, while the local law associations are themselves broadly-
et Two other resolutions related to the Law Society's participation in
law reform and establishment of a liability insurance scheme (discussed
supra) . The former resolution was defeated: the latter passed.
32 See L.S.U.C . Professional Conduct Handbook. Ruling 31 (adopted
October, 1957) . However. the nroprietry of such tariffs was subjected to a
scathing indictment in Re Solicitors, [19701 1 O.R . 407 (Taxing Officer
McBride) .
33 See supra.
"'See Howland, The Treasurer Reports (1969), 3 L.S.U.C . Gaz. 1,
at p. 32 .
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based and reasonably democratic, they were not part of the formal
governmental processes of the Society." The Windsor meeting it-
self, on the other hand, was formally convened by the benchers
and was open to all members of the Society, its agenda and pro-
cedures were established by the benchers, and the benchers de-
cided what effect to give to the deliberations. The reaction of the
benchers to the Windsor resolutions was therefore somewhat sur-
prising.
In a letter to the members of the Society, the Treasurer
affirmed that "serious consideration" had been given to the Wind-
sor resolutions, but implicitly indicated that the benchers had not
felt themselves bound by the action of the membership meeting:
Convocation . . . felt that the members would expect it to recommend
such amendments as it considered to be in the best interests of the
profession as a whole. ss
Subsequently, in a letter to the Leader of the Opposition, the
Treasurer took the position that :
The Benchers felt that they would be subject to considerable criticism
if they treated the general membership as being bound by important
resolutions which it did not know were being considered. $'
To be sure, As the Treasurer indicated, no advance notice of
the resolutions was circulated to the profession, and only a small
fraction of the whole profession was present at the meeting. In
this sense, the voice of those assembled could hardly be said to be
"vox populi". However, the Windsor meeting was the only formal
opportunity afforded for collective membership action, and it is
therefore unfortunate that its resolutions should have been treated
in this way. In the result, the reaction of the local law associations,
and of individual lawyers, was considered together with the Wind-
sor resolutions, and a new draft statute, the eleventh, approved
for publication on April 18th, 1969 . The benchers actually did
adopt some of the Windsor resolutions in the new draft, but did
not accept them, verbatim . In two particular instances, the benchers
adopted an obvious posture of .compromise : elections were sched-
uled for four-year intervals, and the number of elected benchers
was set at forty.
Members were again invited to transmit their reactions through
their local law associations, whose corporate views were also
sought, and the benchers ultimately concluded that a broad con
sensus had been reached within the profession. The Society then
presented its draft statute to the government . After discussions
85 O. Reg. 419/70 , s . 28, now provides for the formation of local law
associations, but assigns them no governmental - function other than the
management of a local law library .
ss op. cit., supra, footnote 55 .
87 see legislative debates, op. cit., supra, footnote 13, at p. 1282 et seq.
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between the benchers and the Attorney General, and further
mutually acceptable changes, the new Act was finally given first
reading in the legislature on February 27th, 1970, as a government
bill."
The processes by which the Law Society reworked its own
constitution do demonstrate a willingness on the part of the ben-
chers to seek the views of the members, to afford these views some
weight and ultimately to give to the members an accounting of
the action taken by the authoritative decision-makers, the ben-
chers. But while this acceptance of full internal accountability is
praiseworthy, it still cannot be described as effective democracy .
The only constituent meeting of members produced the Windsor
resolutions which were not accepted as binding by the benchers,
and which were modified in the light of the views of the local law
associations and of individual lawyers.
If the processes of constitution-making were not fully demo-
cratic, the new Act itself does represent considerable progress
towards that goal. Of course, democratic election of the benchers
had already been guaranteed under the old statute, and in that
sense the ultimate basis of membership control had already been
established. However, the increased frequency of elections and
numbers of benchers will likely ensure a greater turnover in the
ranks of those elected, and thus presumably make Convocation
more nearly reflective of membership views. In this regard, a
provision" in the new election rules which identifies all incumbent
benchers can only be intended to assist their reelection, and thus
must be viewed as contrary to the whole thrust of the amend-
ments adopted following the Windsor resolutions .
A significant step towards democratization was the capture of
Convocation and its committees by the elected, rather than ex
officio, benchers . In the former Law Society Act," and in the draft
of the new Act first circulated by the benchers," a number of
benchers held office without a renewable electoral mandate. In
addition to a number of purely honorary benchers who would ob-
viously never have participated in the Society's affairs," the ex
officio benchers under the former statute included the provincial
Attorney General (to whom new and important duties are now
assigned), retired Ontario judges of the Supreme Court of Canada
and the Exchequer Court, retired judges of the Ontario Supreme
Court, ex-Treasurers and benchers who had won four successive
" Letter to the members of the Society from W. G. C. Howland, Q.C.,
Treasurer, March 4th, 1970 .
as Rules, op . cit., supra, footnote 19, s. 12 (1) .
"Law Society Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 207, s. 5.
" Draft of a Proposed New Law Society Act, as approved by Convoca-
tion on November 15th, 1968, s. 12 (c) ." This group included a former prime minister, the Governor-General
of Canada, and a member of the Royal Family .
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elections."
In effect, Convocation had become a unicameral parliament
with an admixture of Lords and Commons. Inevitably, the greater
experience and prestige of the "Lords", the ex-Treasurers and
long-serving benchers, must have given them the opportunity to
dominate the Society's deliberations. Whether they used this op-
portunity or not is impossible to document, but if they did not,
it is a tribute to their self-restraint rather than to the inherent
wisdom of the institutional arrangements . The position in Ontario
of long-serving benchers, for example, should be contrasted with
that of some other provincial societies which, far from conferring
life tenure on long-serving benchers, compulsorily retired them."
The point, however, is not that they exercised a decisive, conserva-
tive influence on the policy of the Society-many, no doubt, were
active and forward looking-but rather that their very presence
was undemocratic in principle.
As has been noted, one of the key Windsor resolutions pro-
vided that no more life benchers should be appointed. Following
the Windsor meeting, the draft statute of April 18th, 1969 pro
vided that ex officio benchers should continue to be appointed
more or less as in the past." However, their status was dramati-
cally altered by a provision withdrawing their right to vote in
Convocation or on committees ." Only ex-Treasurers remain as
benchers ex officio with full voting privileges ." This. arrangement
was carried forward into the legislation as ultimately enacted." In
essence, then, control of the Society's affairs has now passed into
the hands of the democratically-elected representatives of the
members.
In so far as an effective democratic constitution should afford
opportunities. for direct membership action, however, the new
statute is not beyond reproach .
Other than acknowledging the existence of members of the
Society," and providing for an annual meeting" the new Act makes
no explicit provision for "participatory democracy". In this sense,
the Society's constitutional progress does reflect the inability of
our national polity to translate this ideal into workable institu-
ss Law Society Act, supra, footnote 90, s. 5.
s4 See Barristers and Solicitors Act, R.S.N.S ., 1967, c. 18, s. 18 (as
am . S.N.S ., 1969, c. 27); Legal Profession Act, R.S .S ., 1969, c. 301, s.
17 (2) ."S. 11 . The draft, however, did terminate future appointments of re-
tired judges to be ex officio benchers and altered the period for long-
serving benchers to conform to the new four-year election cycle ."S. 11 (2) .
97S. 12 .
" Ss 12 and 14 .
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tions within the framework of representative government. Ironi-
cally, it is the fact that the Society is a corporation which may
lead to more active membership control over the benchers .
When the new Act was introduced into the legislature, the
provisions of the Corporations Act"' were made applicable to the
Law Society," thus reversing the explicit exclusion of the Cor
porations Act contained in the Law Society's own draft."' The
Corporations Act contains several important provisions designed
to maintain ultimate control in the hands of members, rather than
the directors of the organizations ("corporations without share
capital") to which it applies .
For example, under the Corporations Act, by-laws passed by
the directors involving such important matters as the admission
of members, fees, elections and "the conduct in all other parti
culars of the affairs of the corporation", are subject to confirma-
tion by the general meeting of the members, and are only valid
until the next succeeding annual meeting unless so confirmed."'
The Corporations Act also permits membership policy initiatives
by permitting a small group of members, by requisition, to compel
the calling of a general meeting,"' to place resolutions on its
agenda, or to circulate statements regarding any pending business
of the general meeting."' Do these general provisions of the
Corporations Act enure to the benefit of members of the Law
Society?
The Law Society Act does provide that "in the event of conflict
between any provision of this Act and any provision of the Cor-
porations Act, the provision of this Act prevails" ."' However, the
Law Society Act contains no provisions which relate directly to the
matters just enumerated, save a general power to make rules and
regulations in these areas."' The question then becomes whether
regulations made pursuant to this power can claim priority over
the provisions of the Corporations Act.
The case can be tested in relation to the critical issue of the
power of membership meetings . The new Law Society Act simply
stipulates that there shall be an annual membership meeting."'
However, rules adopted under a general regulation-making power
provide :
Any resolution duly passed at an annual general meeting must be
m' R.S.,9 ., 1960, c. 71 .102 S. 6.
"'Draft of a Proposed New Law Society Act, as
vocation on April 18th, 1969, s. 4.
104 S. 112 (2).
101 S. 308.
"IS . 309."' S. 6.
10e Ss 54 and 55 .... S. 3 does not establish the
approved by Con-
constitutional role of this meeting.
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considered by Convocation within six months of the meeting but is
not binding on Convocation . "'
Thus, in one respect the rules envisage a far more limited role for
the membership meeting than does the Corporations Act.
n the other hand, in another respect the rules afford even
greater opportunity for membership initiatives. If the benchers
fail to implement a resolution passed at the annual meeting, on
petition of 100 members a mailed referendum must be conducted,
and if it produces a two-thirds confirming majority, Convocation
is required to implement the resolution "to the extent that it is by
law able to do"."'
There is no necessary conflict between the provisions of the
two statutes in terms of their relative assignment of powers to
the members as against the directors (or benchers) . The conflict
arises only as the result of the way in which the benchers have
exercised their power to make rules . That they have chosen to
do so in a way which detracts to some degree from rights afforded
by the Corporations Act is not, on its face, justified by the "con-
flict" provision cited above, by their broad power to "govern the
affairs of the Society",'. Z and least of all by a statutory admonition
that "the rules . . . shall be interpreted as if they formed part of
[the Law Society] Act" ."' However, more important in the long
run than whether the rules are valid or not is the substantive issue
of the nature of membership control in the Law Society. This issue
will ultimately be decided not by litigation over the effect of the
Corporations Act but rather by explicit legislation and rulemaking
designed to further democratize the government of the Society .
This last assertion is not intended to denigrate the real im-
portance of organic growth within the parameters set by the
existing legislation . For example, the potentially innocuous role
of the annual meeting has been alluded to, and a suggestion has
been made that the local law associations are emerging as an ef-
fective vehicle of "grassroots" opinion. Neither as prescription nor
as description do these two developments necessarily flow from
the language of the new Law Society Act. Both are the product
of the benchers' exercise of their power to make regulations, and
consequently of the benchers' perceptions and attitudes. Thus, an
important factor in further progress towards fuller democratiza-
tion will be the informal processes by which the benchers' attitudes
are influenced.
The simple demographic facts of life in the profession will no
doubt be extremely significant as well. As the number of lawyers
ii°Rules, op. cit., supra, footnote 19, s . 52 (7) .
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has grown rapidly since World War II, the close informal liaisons
which may have been possible in an earlier time were bound to
give way to feelings of estrangement from the centres of power
on the part of many in the profession. To the extent that this
growth in size has been accompanied by stratification based on a
broader spectrum of legal careers and of ethnic, social, and
economic backgrounds, the risk of estrangement was magnified."'
Finally, the influx of young people, who constitute an increasing
percentage of the profession as a whole, will necessarily import
new life styles and philosophies . All of these demographic factors
are producing a new constituency of opinion, a new electorate, and
ultimately a new breed of bencher.
The infrastructure of professional government will also be im-
portant . For example, until May, 1967, with the first appearance
of the Latin Society Gazette, there was no professional forum for
the exchange of views relating to the Society's policies . Publica-
tion of the Treasurer's annual statement in the Ontario Reports
dates only from this period as well. The minutes of Convocation,
to be sure, had been published for many years in the Ontario
Reports, to which every Ontario lawyer is automatically a sub-
scriber. However, the minutes were (and continue to be) both
tardy and summary ; they convey basic information about decisions
already taken, rather than variety of views about the wisdom of
future policies . As the members become better informed, they may
well find ways of registering their views with the benchers .
Broader participation in .decision-making may also be achieved
by the establishment of mixed committees of benchers and non-
benchers . l 'S Both through informal working relationships, and
through committee reports and recommendations, more rank-and-
file members will be able to make significant contributions to the
policies of the Society, and the attitudes o£ the benchers . The
ua To some extent, this point was only brought home to the benchers
during the course of legislative consideration of the Act. For example,
legislative criticism led to the abandonment of a Law Society proposal that
all members of its secretariat be "Canadian citizens or other British sub-
jects" . This rather silly provision, obviously out of keeping with the spirit
of contemporary fair employment codes, was vaguely reminiscent of the
Test Act requirements of the Stuart Restoration.
its The new Rules of the Society provide that "each standing committee
of the benchers shall be composed of not less than [a specified number of]
members" (s . 28) . In context, this usage of members might be taken to
refer to "members of the benchers", rather than rank-and-file "members
of the Society", an inference buttressed by the special identification of the
Legal Aid Committee as a "standing committee of the Society" with a
specific non-bencher membership (s . 47) . On the other hand, the Law
Society Act requires that "the rules shall be interpreted as if they formed
part of this Act" (s . 54(2)) and the Act also defines a "member" as "a
member of the Society" (s . 1(c) ) . There seems, at least, no statutory
obstacle to service by non-benchers on all standing committees .
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recently-formed committee on legal education.. . would seem to be
a prototype for this form of participation .
A third element in a vital infrastructure is the presence of
voluntary and special interest groups within the profession . The
Canadian Bar Association, of course, has long attracted the mem
bership of most Ontario lawyers. Intensification of its activities,
appointment of an Ontario secretary, and its formal representation
on the new Law Society Council, indicate that the Association
(and perhaps its specialist sub-sections) may become more in-
fluential in the formal decision-making process of the Society. The
expanded role of the local law associations has likewise been
recognized by their representation on the Law Society Council.
New groups are also emerging : the Advocates' Society (restricted
to litigation lawyers), the Ontario Law Students' Association, and
the faculties of the law schools. Each of these groups will no
doubt be a force to be reckoned with in the formulation of policy,
particularly when its -own special interests are affected .
Conclusion
In so far as it relates to internal reforms, the new Law Society Act
does move the government of the legal profession beyond mere
accountability to representative democracy, and perhaps to the
threshhold of participatory democracy . The stage is set for further
organic growth ; the responsibility for cultivating a fuller democracy
now rests squarely with the members.
In so far as the principle of public accountability is introduced
for the first time in the new Act, this must be counted as a major
advance as well. However, the public presence is less well-defined
than it might be, and may turn out to be illusory. So long as the
Society continues to be reasonably responsive to public needs, it
is unlikely that there will be strong external pressures for further
constitutional change. On the other hand, advisory bodies such
as the new Law Society Council tend to follow one of two life
cycles : either they atrophy because they do nothing, or they assert
themselves and acquire new powers because their members are
unwilling to participate in a purely symbolic exercise. Thus, even
in relation to public accountability the new arrangements are un-
likely to survive for long without significant change .
At a minimum, it can safely be predicted that the government
of the legal profession will not again complete a half-century with-
out scrutiny .
its See Special Committee on Legal Education (1970), 4 L.S.U.C.Gaz. 116.
